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We use establishment data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey
(JOLTS) to study the micro-level behavior of worker quits and their relation to re-
cruitment and establishment growth. We ￿nd that quits decline with establishment
growth, playing the most important role at slowly contracting ￿rms. We also ￿nd
a robust, positive relationship between an establishment￿ s reported hires and vacan-
cies and the incidence of a quit. This relationship occurs despite the ￿nding that
quits decline, and hires and vacancies increase, with establishment growth. We char-
acterize these dynamics within a labor-market search model with on-the-job search, a
convex cost of creating new positions, and multi-worker establishments. The model
distinguishes between recruiting to replace a quitting worker and recruiting for a new
position, and relates this distinction to ￿rm performance. Beyond giving rise to a
varying quit propensity, the model generates endogenously-determined thresholds for
￿rm contraction (through both layo⁄s and attrition), worker replacement, and ￿rm ex-
pansion. The continuum of decision rules derived from these thresholds produces rich
￿rm-level dynamics and quit behavior that are broadly consistent with the empirical
evidence of the JOLTS data.
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Quits are a critical part of worker turnover, comprising over half of all separations in the U.S.
economy. Much of the existing literature focuses on quits from the perspective of the worker
(e.g., Topel and Ward (1992)) and, more speci￿cally, on the wage bene￿ts from switching
jobs. Quits, however, also a⁄ect the ￿rm that a worker leaves behind. In particular, quits
may signify hard times at the employing ￿rm or may simply leave the employing ￿rm with a
vacant and pro￿table position. Our aim in this paper, therefore, is to study quits and their
relationship to employment dynamics and recruitment from the perspective of the employer
using the recently released Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey. The JOLTS is the
￿rst data set in the United States providing establishment-level information on both worker
turnover and vacancies. We start by documenting key characteristics of quits, establishment
dynamics and recruitment in the JOLTS data based on our own analysis and on that of Davis,
Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a). We
then study how a model anchored in the search and matching tradition fares in accounting
for the observed features of the JOLTS data. We ￿nd that, once appropriately extended,
the model produces rich dynamics that are broadly consistent with the empirical evidence
in the JOLTS.
The JOLTS evidence shows that both quits and layo⁄s increase with the size of an
employer contraction but do so at di⁄erent rates. Layo⁄s are a much higher share of large
contractions, while quits account for the majority of smaller contractions. In addition, even
though quits fall and the vacancy and hiring rates rise with employer growth, there is a
robust, positive relationship between hires, vacancies, and the quit rate. Furthermore, the
2￿vacancy yield￿(the number of observed hires per reported vacancy) increases with employer
growth. Finally, while recruitment and hiring are concentrated at expanding establishments,
contracting establishments also exhibit a non-trivial amount of recruiting.
To capture these regularities, we develop a model where ￿rms and workers meet randomly
through a matching process. In the model, ￿rms have heterogeneous productivities that
change over time and face a convex cost of position creation (as in Fujita and Ramey (2007)).
This results in multi-worker ￿rms experiencing expansions and contractions in response to
productivity shocks. To make the distinction between quits and layo⁄s, we allow for on-the-
job search and identify quits through job-to-job transitions. Furthermore, to capture the
positive relationship between vacancies and quits, we introduce the notion of replacement
hiring. In particular, we assume that the upfront cost of position creation need not be paid
if a ￿rm is recruiting to replace a quitting worker. This means that the position itself is
not destroyed when a worker quits; rather, the worker leaves the physical and organizational
capital behind, making the replacement of a quitting worker less costly than the creation
of an entirely new position. This notion of quit replacement is novel to our model. Even
though previous matching models address the notion of on-the-job search (Pissarides (1994);
Mortensen (1994); and NagypÆl (2007a)), the literature is silent on the issue of what happens
to a position once a worker leaves. Our model highlights the fact that a ￿rm has a choice
when facing this situation: it can post a vacancy to re￿ll the position, or it can let the job
disappear.
The probabilities that a worker quits or that a vacant position is ￿lled at a ￿rm are both
endogenously determined within the model. High-productivity ￿rms o⁄er higher wages.
This decreases the chance that an employee quits the ￿rm for a better o⁄er and increases the
3chance that a searching worker accepts its own o⁄er. Moreover, we show that ￿rm dynamics
in the model can be characterized by three productivity thresholds. When productivity
is below the ￿rst threshold, ￿rms lay o⁄ their entire workforce and shut down. When
productivity is between the ￿rst and second thresholds, ￿rms choose not to replace workers
who leave and, therefore, contract through attrition. When productivity is between the
second and third thresholds, ￿rms hire to replace workers who leave but no more. Finally,
when productivity is above the third threshold, ￿rms choose to both replace workers and
expand.
The model implies that new position creation increases with ￿rm productivity, quits and
layo⁄s decline with ￿rm productivity, and the probability that a worker accepts a new job
o⁄er increases with the productivity of that job. Given the positive association between ￿rm
productivity and ￿rm growth, the model predicts that the job-￿lling rate (and the related
vacancy yield) increases with ￿rm growth, while the quit rate decreases with ￿rm growth.
As in the data, these relationships are nonlinear. Moreover, quits are the dominant form
of separations for relatively small contractions (which occur in the ￿attrition￿region of the
decision continuum), while layo⁄s dominate for large contractions. The model also pro-
duces a positive relationship between hires and quits, as well as vacancies and quits. We also
uncover a tension between ￿tting di⁄erent aspects of the data, since our model counterfac-
tually predicts a higher than observed vacancy rate for slowly contracting establishments.
Overall, though, the model is able to replicate many of the key cross-sectional patterns in
the microdata.
Our process of on-the-job search and worker replacement is closely related to the concept
of ￿vacancy chains￿described by Akerlof, Rose, and Yellen (1988). It also builds on models,
4such as those of Bertola and Caballero (1994) and Bertola and Garibaldi (2001), that incor-
porate ￿rm size into the search framework. Finally, our model is similar to that of Cooper,
Haltiwanger, and Willis (2006), except that we include on-the-job-search and are more con-
cerned with the cross-sectional responses of employers than with aggregate dynamics.
2 Evidence on quits and worker recruitment
2.1 Data and measurement
For our empirical analysis, we use microdata from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover
Survey (JOLTS), produced by the BLS. The JOLTS data are a monthly sample of roughly
16,000 establishments. Each month, establishments report their employment level, hires,
separations, and vacancies (job openings). The data are ideal for our purposes because
separations are reported separately as quits, layo⁄s and discharges, and other separations
(e.g., retirements). In addition, the data are reported directly by establishments and are
representative of the U.S. economy. The data include a ￿ ow measure of hires and separations;
i.e., they include all hires and separations an establishment has over the month. The data
include a stock measure of vacancies measured as the number of open vacancies on the
last day of the month. The survey includes both a certainty sample (which is surveyed
every month) and a random sample (which is surveyed for 18 consecutive months). We
use data pooled over the December 2000 to January 2005 period and restrict our sample
to establishments with observations in at least two consecutive months to avoid issues with
establishment entry and exit. Our ￿nal sample contains about 377,000 establishment-month
5observations.
The way in which the JOLTS data are reported creates some challenges in producing a
consistent measure of establishment-level employment growth. To address this, we employ
the symmetric measure of growth de￿ned by Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996) and
apply it to the JOLTS data using the same approach as Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger




2(Nit + e Ni;t￿1)
; (1)
where Hit is the number of hires, Sit is the number of separations, Nit is employment and
e Ni;t￿1 = Nit￿Hit+Sit is the revised measure of employment in t￿1 used to ensure consistency
between hires, separations, and the growth rate. Using this measure, an establishment￿ s
growth rate is its net employment change divided by the average of the current and previous
months￿employment. We measure hiring, quit, layo⁄, and vacancy rates using the same
denominator.
Even with all of its advantages, the JOLTS data leave us with several empirical challenges.
Some are common to all studies of establishment data. First, there exists an endogeneity
issue because, theoretically, worker turnover, recruiting e⁄ort, and growth are jointly deter-
mined by the prospects an establishment faces. Second, heterogeneity in size and in other
￿xed characteristics of establishments can a⁄ect our results. By their nature, smaller es-
tablishments have ￿lumpy￿employment changes ￿their growth rates are often zero, and
conditional on being nonzero they tend to be relatively large in absolute value by construc-
tion. Some establishments also tend to be high-turnover establishments (because of their
6industry, demand structure, labor force composition, etc.). We can address these issues with
establishment ￿xed e⁄ects and by reporting results separately by industry and establishment
size.
Other challenges are speci￿c to the JOLTS data. One of these is observability. Ideally, we
would like information relating hires, vacancies, and quits to speci￿c positions but our data
are at the establishment level; i.e., the data report only the total number of hires, vacancies,
and separations at each establishment. Our other challenge is timing. Since the JOLTS
measures vacancies as a stock at the end of the month, vacancies opened and ￿lled during
the month do not appear in the data, which creates a time aggregation problem.1 Timing
also in￿ uences the sequencing of observed quits, vacancies, and hires. Namely, if a worker
quits in month t and the ￿rm decides to replace him, this can show up either as a hire in
month t or as a vacancy at the end of month t and a hire in month t + 1 or later. This, of
course, assumes that the ￿rm was not anticipating the quit. We address the timing issue
by focusing our analysis on the relationship of quits in a month with contemporaneous hires
and vacancies and leading hires.
2.2 Quits, recruitment, and establishment growth
Quits comprise a large fraction of worker turnover, accounting for 54 percent of all separa-
tions in the JOLTS data between December 2000 and January 2005.2 An important part of
understanding quits and recruitment behavior is characterizing how each relates to estab-
lishment growth. In relating theory to the evidence, one can think of employment growth
1Burdett and Cunningham (1998) report that, in the 1982 Employment Opportunity Pilot Project, 44
percent of vacancies ended within seven days and 72 percent of vacancies ended within two weeks.
2For comparison, NagypÆl (2008) ￿nds that job-related quits account for 55 percent of separations in the
Survey of Income and Program Participation.
7(particularly the high-frequency changes we observe in our data) as being determined by
idiosyncratic shocks to ￿rm pro￿tability (i.e., productivity or demand). Matching models
with on-the-job search, such as the one we present below, imply that the likelihood that a
worker quits decreases with a ￿rm￿ s pro￿tability, since the probability of receiving a more
attractive outside o⁄er decreases as the fortune of the current employer improves. At the
same time, adverse shocks to pro￿tability increase the likelihood of a layo⁄and decrease the
payo⁄ from opening new vacancies. Thus, theory suggests di⁄erent relationships between
worker ￿ ows, vacancies, and establishment growth.
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger
(2006a) illustrate some of these relationships. We replicate their ￿ndings in Figures 1 through
3 using our pooled establishment-month observations.3 Figure 1 shows the quit and layo⁄
rates as functions of the establishment growth rate. It illustrates that these rates increase
with the size of an employment contraction. They are low and essentially constant in ex-
panding establishments and are lowest for establishments with a small or no employment
change. Among stable and expanding establishments, quits slightly outpace layo⁄s, while
among contracting establishments, layo⁄s increase sharply and almost linearly with the size
of a contraction. Quits, however, increase rapidly with smaller contractions but then level o⁄
at around 10 percent of employment for larger contractions. Thus, quits are more important
than layo⁄s for small contractions, but layo⁄s account for an increasing share of separations
as a contraction gets larger. When interpreting these ￿gures, note that over 90 percent of
employment is at establishments with absolute growth rates of less than 10 percent, implying
3Davis et al. (2006a, 2006b) estimate these relationships by calculating the weighted mean values of the
noted variables for ￿ne growth rate intervals using the same JOLTS sample as our own. In a semi-parametric
estimation, they show that these results are robust to the inclusion of establishment ￿xed e⁄ects.
8that quits are a substantial component of separations for most employment changes.
Figure 2 depicts the hiring and vacancy rates as functions of the contemporaneous es-
tablishment growth rate. The ￿gure illustrates a small but positive amount of hiring among
shrinking establishments. Stable establishments have the lowest hiring rate, while the hiring
rate increases almost linearly with the establishment growth rate for expanding establish-
ments (the latter occurs almost by construction). Vacancy rates exhibit a similar nonlinear
increasing relation to the establishment growth rate but rise less rapidly than hires. Con-
tracting establishments also have a positive, relatively constant vacancy rate.
Finally, Figure 3 shows the vacancy yield (the number of hires in month t per vacancies
open at the end of month t￿1 for establishments reporting at least one vacancy) as a function
of the establishment employment growth rate in month t. Due to the timing di⁄erence
and the requirement of positive reported vacancies, this is not simply a ratio of the two
series in Figure 2. The vacancy yield increases rapidly with the establishment growth rate,
particularly among expanding establishments, implying that establishments have more hires
per vacancy the larger their expansion. The yield is essentially constant for contractions and
is lowest for establishments with no employment change.
2.3 Quits and recruitment, discrete relations
In this section, we look at how quits relate to vacancies posted and hires made subsequently.
We report basic summary statistics in Table 1. The upper panel of the table shows quit,
layo⁄, hiring, and vacancy rates for the full sample and the sample broken down by whether
a quit occurred during the month. Hiring and vacancy rates are substantially higher when
9preceded by a quit. The vacancy rate is more than twice as high when a quit occurs in
the preceding month. The layo⁄ rate, on the other hand, shows little di⁄erence based on
quit incidence. The bottom half of Table 1 shows that only 14 percent of all establishments
report any quits in the preceding month, but these establishments make up 58 percent of
employment, implying that most quits occur at larger establishments. The last two columns
show that establishments with at least one quit account for a disproportionate number of
vacancies and hires, accounting for 65 percent of all hires and 74 percent of all vacancies.
These numbers are particularly striking given the patterns in Figures 1 and 2, which showed
the highest hiring and vacancy rates among expanding establishments and the highest quit
rates among contracting establishments.
To study the quit-recruitment relationship further, we estimate the probability of having
at least one vacancy or at least one hire by the incidence of a prior quit. We report the
results in Table 2. For all establishments, the incidence of a quit substantially increases
the probability of a subsequent vacancy or hire. The likelihood of each increases by about
50 percentage points. Of course, this could be due to di⁄erent quit, vacancy, and hiring
incidence by industry or, more to the point, by size class. Yet, we ￿nd that the same
pattern holds across all industries and size classes, though there is considerable variation
in the di⁄erence by quit incidence. Across establishment size classes, the probabilities of a
vacancy or hire increase with size as expected. In all cases, these probabilities are higher
when there is a preceding quit, though the di⁄erence decreases with establishment size.
As a robustness check, we replicate the results of Tables 1 and 2 by layo⁄rather than quit
incidence. Speci￿cally, we split the data based on whether or not there is a preceding layo⁄
with no preceding quit, so that the exercise is independent of any quit-related outcomes.
10Our goal is to see whether the quit-hires and quit-vacancy relationships are unique to quits
or are simply a general pattern due to higher turnover. The results in Table 3 suggest that
the relations are unique to quits. While the hiring rate is higher when preceded by a layo⁄,
the vacancy rate is not. Overall, layo⁄s that occur in the absence of a quit account for
6.4 percent of employment. They account for a higher fraction of hires (7.9 percent) but a
smaller fraction of vacancies (5.9 percent). One reason for the mixed results may be that
the JOLTS de￿nition of layo⁄s includes not only layo⁄s but also ￿rings, which could lead to
the same worker replacement motive that we attribute to quits. Nevertheless, the discrete
probabilities of a vacancy or a hire based on the incidence of a preceding layo⁄(again, absent
a preceding quit) are much di⁄erent than those observed in Table 2. While the presence of a
preceding quit is associated with a 50-percentage-point higher probability of either a vacancy
or a hire, the presence of a preceding layo⁄ is associated with a 9-percentage-point decrease
in the probability of a vacancy and a 3-percentage-point decrease in the probability of a hire.
Thus, there is a stark di⁄erence in recruitment behavior depending on whether it follows a
quit or a layo⁄.
2.4 Quits and recruitment, continuous relations
Thus far, our evidence has consistently suggested a positive relation between the incidence
of a quit and subsequent vacancies and hiring. This relation occurs despite the fact that the
quit rate declines with establishment growth and the vacancy and hiring rates increase with
establishment growth. For our ￿nal analysis, we study the relationship between quits and
vacancies and between quits and hires within a regression framework, where we can control
11for the e⁄ects of establishment characteristics and growth.
We regress hires both in the subsequent month (t+1) and current month (t) on the quit
rate, since a quit could be replaced within the same month. We also regress vacancies at the
end of the month on the quit rate. In each case we run (i) the unconditional OLS regression
of the variable on the quit rate, (ii) the same regression controlling for establishment ￿xed
e⁄ects, (iii) the regression controlling for establishment ￿xed e⁄ects and the employment
growth rate, and (iv) the regression controlling for establishment ￿xed e⁄ects and the growth
rate di⁄erentiated into positive and negative changes. For the regressions of contemporaneous
hires on the quit rate, we face an endogeneity issue when we include the growth rate in the
latter two speci￿cations. To account for this, we instrument the contemporaneous growth
rate using the prior month￿ s growth rate as the instrument.
Table 4 lists the regression results. It shows that the positive relations of leading hires,
contemporaneous hires, and vacancies to quits are robust to controlling for establishment
￿xed e⁄ects and establishment growth. Contemporaneous hires actually have a stronger
relation to the quit rate than hires in the subsequent month. These hires can, of course,
occur before a quit, confounding the relation we wish to identify. Nevertheless, even when
controlling for and instrumenting for the growth rate, the relationship between these hires
and the quit rate still holds.
We also replicate the regressions in columns (1), (2), and (3) of Table 4, substituting
the continuous quit rate variable with dummy variables for discrete quit rate intervals.4 We
then plot the coe¢ cients on the quit rate graphically (with the means added back where
4These dummy variables represent intervals that increase in size with the quit rate. We use a varying
interval length to maintain precision because the number of observations declines sharply as the quit rate
increases. We also appropriate establishments with zero quits to a separate interval.
12appropriate). We again use an IV estimate when including the growth rate in the regression
of contemporaneous hires. Our results are in Figure 4. The panels show the results for
leading hires, contemporaneous hires, and vacancies, respectively. The unconditional regres-
sion speci￿cations (analogous to column (1) in Table 4) illustrate the strongly increasing
relationships of hiring and vacancies to quits. The main results of Figure 4 show that when
we control for establishment ￿xed e⁄ects and establishment growth, the slope of the rela-
tionships becomes ￿ atter (particularly for leading hires), but the positive relations remain
in all cases.
To summarize our empirical results, we ￿nd that establishments with a quit account for
a disproportionately large fraction of subsequent vacancies and hiring. Across a broad set
of metrics, we ￿nd a positive relationship between the incidence of a quit and subsequent
vacancies and hiring. This relation holds up even after controlling for endogeneity issues
related to establishment growth, timing, and observability issues that come from studying
establishment rather than job-speci￿c data, and ￿xed establishment characteristics, including
industry and size. These ￿ndings suggest that quits, and the recruiting behavior they appear
to initiate, are important facets of establishment-level employment adjustment, and they
account for a signi￿cant portion of high-frequency labor-market dynamics.
3 Model
We now formalize a model that fully characterizes the spectrumof employment adjustment by
￿rms and allows for quits and their potential replacement as endogenous decisions by workers
and ￿rms, respectively. We consider a matching model with endogenous separations, in the
13spirit of Mortensen and Pissarides (1994). We allow for on-the-job search, as in NagypÆl
(2007a), and introduce recruiting costs that di⁄erentiate between a sunk job-creation cost
and the ￿ ow cost of advertising a job (as in Fujita and Ramey (2007)).5 The former captures
the organizational and physical capital required to create a new position, while the latter
captures the cost of searching for a suitable worker to ￿ll that position. Convexity of the
creation cost gives rise to multi-worker establishments, which in turn allows us to compare
data generated by the model to establishment growth data. The creation cost also allows
us to di⁄erentiate between recruiting to replace a quit and recruiting for a newly created
position.
3.1 Model setup
Consider an economy populated by workers and ￿rms who are both risk-neutral and discount
future incomes at rate r. There is a unit measure of workers who enjoy ￿ ow utility b while
unemployed and enjoy the utility of their wage while employed. There is a measure ￿ of
potential ￿rms, each of which employs one or more workers if its productivity is high enough.
While the set of potential ￿rms is given, variation in productivity generates entry and exit
in the economy. We denote by " a ￿rm￿ s idiosyncratic productivity, which determines the
output of a position at the ￿rm. This productivity evolves stochastically over time: at rate ￿,
a ￿rm draws a new productivity realization from the distribution F(") : [";"] ! [0;1]. These
changes in productivity are what induce changes in a ￿rm￿ s employment and recruitment
policy.
In order to hire workers, ￿rms either create new positions or have empty positions come
5Note that we use the terms "job" and "position" interchangeably.
14available following worker separations. To ￿ll these available positions, ￿rms post vacancies,
which are ￿lled independently of one another. The upfront cost of creating n new positions is
equal to C(n), where C(￿) is a strictly increasing and strictly convex function with C(0) = 0
and C0 (0) ￿ 0. The ￿ ow cost of advertising a vacant position (regardless of whether it is
a new or recently vacated position) is c. The fact that a vacated position does not require
the payment of the upfront cost makes it less costly to recruit for it, which is a crucial
feature of the model. If a vacant position is closed without being ￿lled or if a ￿rm does not
seek to replace a worker at the time of her departure, the position ceases to exist. Once a
match is created, there is no interaction between workers within a ￿rm. This is due to the
linear production technology. Hence, the payo⁄ of a match to the worker and to the ￿rm
is independent of the number of workers a ￿rm employs. In other words, the concept of a
￿rm embedded in this model is that of a multi-worker entity that experiences a common
productivity process.
The ￿rm can terminate workers at any time. In addition, while initially productive,
positions are destroyed at an exogenous rate ￿: Moreover, workers leave the ￿rm for exoge-
nous reasons at rate ￿ and quit at an endogenously determined rate ￿("). Following an
exogenous separation or a quit, the position remains productive and therefore available to
￿ll.
Workers can search while unemployed and employed. Given that positions at di⁄erent
￿rms vary in their productivity and therefore in the wage they o⁄er, workers have an incentive
to search on-the-job. To keep the model simple, the search intensity of employed workers is
￿xed at s 2 (0;1], while that of unemployed workers is normalized at 1.
Wages in the model are determined by workers and ￿rms continuously bargaining over
15and sharing the output from the match without the possibility to commit to future wages.
We assume that the disagreement payo⁄of the worker and the ￿rm is delay in production and
that the search opportunities during delay are the same as during production. The assumed
lack of commitment has several implications. First, the non-convexity of the Pareto frontier
discussed in Shimer (2006) does not arise in this setting, since the worker and the ￿rm bargain
only over the current wage that does not a⁄ect future turnover decisions. Second, when an
employed worker receives an outside o⁄er, she does not have the opportunity to extract the
full rent from the less appealing of the two relationships, since she knows that the instant she
chooses to forgo one of the employment possibilities, the ￿rm can renegotiate. The outcome
of this bargaining game with continuous renegotiation is simply
w(") = b + ￿ (" ￿ b); (2)
where ￿ denotes the bargaining share of the worker. This wage function ensures that turnover
in the model is monotone in the sense that, when workers have multiple employment oppor-
tunities, they always choose to take the job at the most productive ￿rm.6
Contacts between vacancies and searching workers are generated by a constant returns to
scale matching function that is increasing in its two arguments: the economy-wide measure
of vacancies, v, and the measure of workers searching for a job, u+s(1￿u), where u denotes
the measure of unemployed. We de￿ne labor market tightness as ￿ = v
u+s(1￿u) and denote
6For other wage-setting mechanisms, the opportunity to repost vacant positions creates the possibility of
the wage declining with productivity over some range. This is due to the presence of search externalities.
Our speci￿cation of the bargaining game rules out this possibility.
16the rate at which workers contact ￿rms as
￿(￿) =
m(v;u + s(1 ￿ u))
u + s(1 ￿ u)
= m(￿;1) (3)
and the rate at which ￿rms contact workers as ￿ (￿). Given the assumption of a constant
returns to scale matching function, the two are related by ￿(￿) = ￿￿ (￿). Notice that, due
to the presence of on-the-job search, not all matches generated by the matching function
result in the formation of a new employment relationship, since employed workers will reject
o⁄ers from ￿rms with a lower productivity than that of their current employer.
3.2 Characterization of the stationary equilibrium
Let us next introduce some notation. Let the probability that a ￿rm of type " succeeds in
￿lling a vacant position upon contacting a worker be ￿("). Let the unnormalized distrib-
ution of ￿rm productivity across vacancies be H("), so that H (") = v. Then, denote the
normalized distribution of productivity across vacancies by ^ H(") =
H(")
v . Finally, let the
unnormalized distribution of productivity across ￿lled jobs be K("), so that K (") = 1 ￿ u.
Due to the linearity of the production function and the fact that positions at a ￿rm are
￿lled independently of one another, the only state variable that a⁄ects the value of a position
to the worker or the ￿rm is ￿rm productivity, ".
Given our wage-setting assumption, the worker and the ￿rm need not agree at all times
whether to continue an employment relationship. This contrasts with the continuation de-
cision under surplus sharing. Let the set of productivities for which the ￿rm is willing to
continue to operate a job be ￿f (with complement ￿f) and let the set of productivities
17for which the worker is willing to work in a job be ￿w (with complement ￿w). Given the
requirement of mutual consent, an employment relationship will form and continue as long
as " 2 ￿f [ ￿w. The value to a worker of a job with productivity " 2 ￿f [ ￿w is
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where U is the value of unemployment for the worker. The ￿rst term is the ￿ ow wage the
worker receives. The second term re￿ ects the gains of the worker from a quit, which occurs
if the worker encounters a job o⁄er with a higher value than her current job. The third
term re￿ ects the loss associated with job destruction or exogenous separation. The last term
re￿ ects the change in value associated with a new draw of ￿rm productivity and takes into
account that continuation requires mutual agreement; i.e., it only takes place if "0 2 ￿f [￿w.
The value of unemployment can be expressed as
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0); (5)
where the ￿rst term is the ￿ ow utility received by an unemployed worker and the second
term re￿ ects the value a worker gains when she encounters a vacant job.
Similarly, the value of a ￿lled job to a ￿rm with productivity " 2 ￿f [ ￿w is
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;
18where R(") is the ￿rm￿ s expected value of a vacancy. Here, " ￿ w(") represents the net
￿ ow payo⁄ to the ￿rm from operating a productive job. The second term re￿ ects the loss
associated with a worker leaving, either through a quit or an exogenous separation. The
third term re￿ ects the loss from a job-destruction shock. Note that a quit or exogenous
separation leaves a position with a positive reposting value, while the job destruction shock
does not. The last term re￿ ects the change in value associated with a new draw of ￿rm
productivity, which again takes into account that continuation requires mutual agreement.
The value of a vacant job is determined by








The ￿rm can choose to post no vacancy or close a current opening, in which case its payo⁄
is 0, or it can keep the vacancy open, in which case its payo⁄ is the second expression in
the brackets. The ￿rst term in this expression is the ￿ ow cost of vacancy posting, while the
second term re￿ ects the expected gain from meeting a potential new worker. The third term
re￿ ects the loss from the open position exogenously becoming unproductive, while the last
term re￿ ects the change in value associated with a new draw of ￿rm productivity.
Next, we make the following assumption:
Assumption 1. The cost of vacancy posting is large enough so that ￿
R
R("0)dF ("0) < c.
This assumption states that the option value of keeping a vacancy open, which is present
because the productivity of a position can change, is not large enough to justify incurring
the cost of keeping the vacancy open. This implies that there exist some vacated jobs that
19are not pro￿table to repost and are thus closed by ￿rms. The assumption ensures that any
￿lled vacancy is pro￿table to operate at its current productivity, that is, for any vacancy
J(") > R(").
It is straightforward to show that, given the wage equation in (2), the above functional
equations are satis￿ed by a constant U and three increasing functions J, R, and W. The
monotonicity of W has several implications. First, employed workers quit to accept all job




1 ￿ ^ H(")
￿
: (8)
As one can see, the quit rate is decreasing in ": workers are less likely to quit more productive
jobs. Second, a ￿rm with productivity " will have all unemployed workers, as well as all
workers employed at ￿rms with productivity lower than ", accept their job o⁄er, making
their job-￿lling probability:
￿(") =
u + s(1 ￿ u)
K(")
K(")
u + s(1 ￿ u)
=
u + sK(")
u + s(1 ￿ u)
; (9)
where workers are weighted by their search intensity. Last, the job-continuation decision of
the worker has the reservation property ￿the worker chooses unemployment over working at






0) ￿ U)d ^ H("




0) ￿ U)dF ("
0): (10)
Equation (10) states that the di⁄erence between b and ~ "w comes from two sources: the
higher option value of search while unemployed (due to the higher search intensity while
unemployed), re￿ ected by the term on the left-hand side, and the option value of changing
productivity, re￿ ected by the second term on the right-hand side.
Given the monotonicity of J, the job-continuation decision of the ￿rm also has a reser-
vation property. A ￿rm chooses to destroy any job whose productivity falls below some ~ "f,
so that ￿f = [~ "f;"], where ~ "f satis￿es J (~ "f) = 0. The optimality of ~ "f requires that






Equation (11) states that the ￿ ow loss from a job with productivity ~ "f is just o⁄set by
the option value of continuing to operate the job in expectation of an improvement in its
productivity. Given the continuation set of the worker and the ￿rm, the mutually acceptable
job-destruction threshold then is ~ " = max(~ "f;~ "w).
Given the monotonicity of the function R, the vacancy reposting decision of the ￿rm
also has the reservation property ￿￿rms post (or repost) a vacancy when its productivity is
above some threshold ^ ". This threshold satis￿es R(^ ") = 0 or






21Notice that, given Assumption 1, J (^ ") > 0, and therefore ~ " < ^ ". The presence of search
frictions drives a wedge between the two thresholds. Firms with productivity " 2 (~ ";^ ") ￿nd
it pro￿table to continue existing employment relationships but do not ￿nd it pro￿table to
go through costly recruiting if a worker leaves. When workers quit, these ￿rms contract by
attrition.
The ￿xed cost of creating a new job, C(n), implies that R(") is positive for ￿rms with
" > ^ ", even with a free entry of new jobs. Given the upfront cost of creating new jobs, a
￿rm with productivity " opens n(") new jobs to the point where
C
0 (n(")) ￿ R(") (13)
with complementary slackness, n(") ￿ 0. Given the assumption that C0(0) ￿ 0, new jobs
are created by ￿rms that have productivity above some threshold, ￿ ", where
C
0 (0) = R(￿ "): (14)
Monotonicity ensures that ￿ " ￿ ^ ". Moreover, given the properties of C (￿) and R(￿), n(￿) is
increasing in ". Thus, ￿rms with productivity " 2 (^ ";￿ ") ￿nd it pro￿table to replace workers
who leave but do not ￿nd it pro￿table to open new jobs because of their upfront cost. Over
time, such ￿rms will be slowly shrinking due to the destruction of some of their positions.
Firms with " > ￿ " not only replace lost workers but also expand by creating new jobs.
Finally, one can derive the distributions of productivity across vacancies and across ￿lled
jobs in a stationary equilibrium from the appropriate balance equations. In particular, we
22can equate the ￿ ow into H("), which is made up of new vacancies, reposted vacancies, and
existing vacancies that had a change in their productivity, to the ￿ ow out of H("), which is
made up of exogenously destroyed vacancies, ￿lled vacancies, and vacancies that had a

















0) + ￿H("): (15)
Similarly, we can equate the ￿ ow into K("), which is made up of newly ￿lled vacancies and
jobs that had a change in their productivity, to the ￿ ow out of K("), which is made up
exogenously destroyed jobs, jobs made vacant by a quit or exogenous separation, and jobs










0) + ￿K("): (16)
Notice that the total number of jobs ￿lled and the total number of jobs taken have to be












which can be veri￿ed by integration by parts. Equation (16) evaluated at " = " together
with Equation (17) implies the steady-state relationship that equates the ￿ ow out of and
23into unemployment:
￿(￿)u = (￿ + ￿ + ￿F (~ "))(1 ￿ u): (18)
The equilibrium of the model is characterized by eight functions W("), J("), R("), H("),
K("), ￿ ("), ￿("), and n(") and eight constants U;b ";e "f;e "w;￿ ";u;v; and ￿. The eight functions
are de￿ned by Equations (4), (6), (7), (8), (9), (13), (??), and (16), while the eight constants
are de￿ned by Equations (5), (10), (11), (12), (14) and the relationships K (") = 1 ￿ u,
H (") = v, and ￿ = v=(u + s(1 ￿ u)). To solve for this set of equations, it is useful to derive
di⁄erential equations characterizing the functions W("), J("), R("), H("), and K("), which
is done in the Appendix.
4 Model implications
4.1 Qualitative implications
Our model has a rich set of implications for ￿rm dynamics. The model predicts a di-
rect, positive relationship between ￿rm productivity and ￿rm growth. This relationship
is the outcome of the model￿ s implied patterns of worker turnover and recruitment, which
are themselves functions of ￿rm productivity. Given the endogenously determined decision
thresholds, f~ ";^ ";￿ "g, we can distinguish four regions of productivity, each with a di⁄erent
growth prospect.
We depict these regions in Figure 5. In Region 1, productivity is below the separation
threshold, ~ ", so the ￿rm shuts down, endogenously destroying all of its jobs. In Region
242, ￿rms are between the separation threshold and the replacement threshold, ^ ". When
workers separate, either through quits or exogenous separations, ￿rms in this region do not
post vacancies to replace them and thereby contract their employment through attrition.
In Region 3, ￿rms are between the replacement threshold and the job creation threshold,
￿ ". These ￿rms post vacancies to replace workers who leave but do not create any new jobs.
Finally, ￿rms in Region 4 are above the job creation threshold and therefore have the highest
productivity levels. These ￿rms recruit both to replace workers who leave and to ￿ll new
jobs.
These regions create a natural relationship between job ￿ ows (job creation and job de-
struction) and worker ￿ ows (hires and separations). Firms undergo job destruction in Regions
1 and 2 entirely through the separation rate, though separations are all layo⁄s in Region 1
and a mix of quits and layo⁄s in Region 2. In Region 3, ￿rms are essentially stable, since
they recruit to replace those who have separated. Firms in this region can end up without
any job ￿ ows if their hiring rates exactly o⁄set their separation rates. Finally, ￿rms undergo
job creation in Region 4. These ￿rms might still have workers separate, but these losses are
more than o⁄set by hiring, leading to net job gains. Over time, shocks to ￿rm productivity
move ￿rms across these regions, giving rise to rich employment dynamics.
4.2 Model simulation
To examine our model￿ s ability to match the evidence we highlighted in Section 2, we simulate
employment turnover data using a mixture of calibrated and plausibly set parameter values.
For this exercise, we enrich our model along two dimensions to allow it to replicate important
25features of the data. First, we assume that the position destruction rate ￿ decreases with
". This ensures that not all ￿rms experience the same rate of layo⁄s, which would be at
odds with the data. Varying layo⁄ rates could also be introduced by allowing for decreasing
returns to scale in production or for a downward-sloping demand for the ￿rm￿ s output, but
these alternatives would substantially complicate the model. Second, we assume that the
probability that a position that becomes vacant is available to be reposted is given by the
increasing function ￿(") (recall that this probability is unity in the benchmark model). We
introduce this feature to remove the discontinuity in the behavior of vacancies that is present
in the benchmark model around b ".
In terms of the parameter choices, notice ￿rst that the monthly discount rate and the
workers￿bargaining power do not have an impact on the model-predicted turnover. There-
fore, we leave these unspeci￿ed. We set the arrival rate of productivity shocks to be 2
percentper month, which implies that establishments are hit with a productivity shock
every four years on average. We assume that " is distributed uniformly on [0;1] and choose
the ￿ (") function to be a decreasing and convex cubic spline over [e ";"￿] with level parameter
￿m. The parameter "￿ de￿nes where ￿(") = 0 and is chosen to be 0:5. We choose the n(")
function to be an increasing cubic spline over [￿ ";"] with level parameter nm (this is equivalent
to choosing the cost function C (￿) appropriately). The replacement probability function,
￿("), is also set to be a cubic spline such that ￿(b ") = 0 and ￿(￿ ") = 1:
We calibrate the parameters s;￿m;nm to match three calibration targets: the employment-
weighted monthly quit rate in the JOLTS of 1:7 percent, the employment-weighted monthly
layo⁄rate in the JOLTS of 1:1 percent, and the JOLTS average vacancy rate of 2:2 percent.
We calibrate to an unemployment rate of 6:0 percent, which, together with the layo⁄ rate,
26implies a job-￿nding rate of 0:172.7 We let the rate of separations for exogenous reasons, ￿,
equal a third of the layo⁄rate in JOLTS. We calibrate ￿ to match the average establishment
size of 20 workers in the JOLTS. Finally, we set the productivity thresholds as follows:
e " = 0:1;b " = 0:4; and ￿ " = 0:6. (We can recover the deep parameters b;c; and C0 (0) such that
these thresholds constitute an equilibrium.) Using these parameter and threshold values,
we can calculate the model-implied distribution of vacancies and employment, H (") and
K ("), respectively, which determine the functions ￿(") and ￿ (") that allow us to generate
the turnover data.
Figure 6 shows the calibrated ￿ (") and n(") functions. Notice that, given the value
of ￿, we need a relatively large value of ￿ (") for the low productivity ￿rms in order to
generate the targeted layo⁄rate. This is because our simulation has only a small fraction of
employment below "￿. At the same time, ￿rms open a relatively small number of vacancies
(exceeding two only for the most productive establishments) because vacancies in the model
are easy to ￿ll for very productive establishments (they last for 1:3 weeks on average for the
most productive establishment) and the vacancy rate in the data is relatively small. It is
worth noting that the model cannot generate the full establishment size distribution. In
particular, it does not account for the existence of very large establishments, which in turn
explains why there are no establishments with a large number of vacancies. Figure 7 shows
the endogenous quit rate, ￿("), and acceptance probability, ￿("), functions. The quit rate is
constant at 4.3 percent between e " and b ". It then declines steadily until it reaches zero for the
7This is somewhat lower than the monthly job-￿nding rate measure reported by NagypÆl (2008) using
worker turnover data from the Current Population Survey and the Survey of Income and Program Participa-
tion. This is due to the fact that the separation rate in the JOLTS is lower than that measured in the CPS.
Hence, to match the unemployment rate, we need a lower job-￿nding rate. See the discussion in NagypÆl
(2007b).
27highest-productivity establishments. The acceptance probability begins at about 22 percent
at the replacement threshold, b ". It then increases with ", with the highest-productivity
establishments always able to ￿ll their jobs.
We next simulate weekly employment dynamics for a single establishment, discarding the
￿rst 1000 periods of data to eliminate the e⁄ect of initial conditions, to generate a distribution
of ￿rm-level turnover data.8 Given the stationary nature of our model, turnover data over
many periods at a single establishment have the same distribution as turnover data across
many establishments for a shorter period of time.
4.3 Simulation results
Figures 8 through 12 plot our simulation results. Our empirical evidence presents the cross-
sectional patterns of employment dynamics as a function of establishment growth, not pro-
ductivity. Consequently, we depict the mapping of ￿rm productivity " into employment
growth rates in Figure 8.9 The mapping is generally consistent with the description of ￿rm
dynamics in Figure 5. Growth is negative, but rising, between e " and b ". Given the presence
of exogenous job destruction and probabilistic availability of vacant positions, this pattern
continues between b " and ￿ ". For values above ￿ ", new position creation occurs in addition to
replacement hiring, so growth becomes positive and increases somewhat with ".
Figure 9 plots the simulated quit rate and layo⁄ rate as a function of establishment
growth. This ￿gure matches the evidence displayed in Figure 1 along its most important
8In our simulation, we assume that events that take place at some monthly rate x in our model take
place with weekly probability 1 ￿ e￿x=4 each week. This precludes the possibility of more than one event
of a given type taking place within a week, which, given the calibrated arrival rates and the short length of
time is not very restrictive.
9For Figures 8 through 14, we depict the results using a centered MA(5) process that uses the four closest
observations in the moving average. We do this to smooth the noisiness of the stochastic simulation.
28dimension. Namely, layo⁄s dominate quits during large contractions and quits are more
prevalent than layo⁄s during smaller contractions. The model is able to generate a relatively
greater importance of quits during small contractions through the decision of ￿rms with
productivities between e " and b " to contract through attrition when a worker quits. In turn,
the role of quits declines as the size of the contraction gets larger due to the presence of
search frictions. While workers desire to quit quickly contracting ￿rms, it takes time for
them to locate alternative employment opportunities, which limits the rate at which quitting
workers can leave such ￿rms. This ￿nding indicates that our choice of identifying quits with
job-to-job transitions is appropriate, since quitting to unemployment would not be limited
by search frictions. Given our calibration, the layo⁄ rate decreases monotonically with the
establishment growth rate for negative growth rates and is essentially zero for positive growth
rates. The quit rate exhibits a similar pattern, though the rate levels o⁄ at about 5 percent
for contractions of more than 10 percent of employment. This is lower than the 10 percent
quit rate observed for rapidly contracting establishments in the data; keep in mind that we
match the model only to the aggregate quit rate. Adding an endogenous search intensity
choice to the model could overcome this discrepancy, since workers at rapidly contracting
establishments would search harder and get more o⁄ers.
Figure 10 plots the hiring rate and the vacancy rate as a function of the establishment
growth rate. The model matches the behavior of the hiring rate well. It predicts that
the hiring rate is small and positive for shrinking establishments, though the magnitude is
smaller than in the data. The hiring rate also exhibits a non-monotone pattern around
zero growth, implying that establishments with small contractions hire more than stable
establishments, and increases with the size of an establishment expansion. Quit replacement
29plays an important role in creating the non-monotonicity. Establishments with small con-
tractions tend to lose most workers through quits, and although their productivity is high
enough to induce them to try and re￿ll these positions, it is not high enough to produce a
high job-￿lling rate. Figure 10 also shows that the model can replicate the non-monotone
pattern in the vacancy rate around zero growth, as well as a vacancy rate that increases with
the size of an establishment expansion. Again, the incentive to post a vacancy coupled with
a relatively low acceptance probability helps generate the non-monotone pattern. Just as
with the hiring rate, the predicted vacancy rate for establishments with larger contractions
is too low. In turn, the predicted vacancy rate for expanding establishments is too high.
The ￿ ip side of this ￿nding is that the simulated vacancy yield (the number of hires per
vacancy posted at the start of the month) that is plotted in Figure 11 does not rise as much
with establishment growth as in the data. This is because while productivity increases with
establishment growth among expanding establishments, it does so at a slow pace. This then
means that the increase in the job-￿lling probability is not very pronounced among expand-
ing establishments. The vacancy yield also exhibits a jump around zero growth, which is
due to the fact that some of the most productive establishments have grown large and be-
come stable. In sum, the results from the model are broadly consistent with the evidence of
Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a)
that we depicted in Figures 1-3.
Even though our model has a quit rate that declines with growth and hiring and vacancy
rates that increase with growth, it is also able to replicate our own ￿ndings that the hiring
and vacancy rates increase with the quit rate (Figure 4). Figure 12 shows that the model
generates both a hiring rate and a vacancy rate that increases with the quit rate. The
30simulated positive relationships occur because of the incentive for ￿rms with productivity
above b " to replace those who quit.
5 Conclusions
In this paper, we show that the quit-recruitment relationship is a quantitatively important
part of establishment-level employment dynamics. While these dynamics may appear too
complex for a standard model of labor market search to address, we show that a search model
with three extensions ￿on-the-job search, replacement recruiting, and a ￿xed creation cost
for new jobs ￿can account for much of the observed micro-level patterns in the data. With
respect to these patterns, we focus on ￿ndings based on JOLTS microdata from Davis,
Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b) and Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a). We
also present new evidence from the JOLTS data. Our ￿ndings show a robust, positive
relationship between hires, vacancies, and the incidence of a previous quit. We ￿nd that
a disproportionate share of hires and vacancies occur at establishments with at least one
prior quit. We also ￿nd that, at the establishment level, the incidence of a quit substantially
increases the probability of a subsequent hire or vacancy in all industries and for all size
classes. Across establishments, we ￿nd that both the hiring rate and the vacancy rate are
increasing functions of the quit rate.
We then develop a matching model that accounts for the empirical patterns we observe.
The model builds upon a search and matching framework with endogenous job destruction
and on-the-job search by di⁄erentiating between the sunk cost of creating a new job and
the ￿ ow cost of advertising for a vacant position. In the model, multi-worker ￿rms face the
31standard decision of whether to continue or sever a match after an adverse shock to their
productivity. Given the sunk cost of job creation and on-the-job search, ￿rms face additional
decisions whether to replace workers who leave the ￿rm and whether to expand employment.
This creates three thresholds of ￿rm productivity that de￿ne the ￿rm￿ s separation decision,
worker-replacement decision, and job-creation decision. The resulting decision rules create
rich employment dynamics where quits and layo⁄s decrease with ￿rm growth, vacancies and
hiring increase with ￿rm growth, and complex interactions between these processes emerge
when ￿rms must decide whether to replace a worker who leaves or let a job vanish. We ￿nd
that the dynamics of the model are broadly consistent with the existing evidence from the
JOLTS microdata. Namely, the model generates a decision region where relatively small
employment contractions occur primarily through quits, and the model produces a job-
￿lling rate that increases with ￿rm growth. The model also produces ￿rm-level hiring and
vacancy rates that are positively related to the quit rate. The latter comes about through
the potential incentive the model creates for ￿rms to replace workers who leave.
Finally, while this paper focused entirely on the cross-sectional aspects of the model,
the presence of on-the-job search and the distinction between recruiting for a new position
and recruiting to replace a worker may be well-suited to replicate the cyclical movements
in unemployment and vacancies observed in the data. For example, the quit replacement
distinction, coupled with the ￿xed cost of job creation and ￿ ow cost of vacancy posting, can
produce a countercyclical recruitment cost, since it would be less costly to replace a quit
during booms.
326 Appendix
This appendix details the derivation of the necessary di⁄erential equations needed to char-





r + ￿ + ￿ + ￿(") + ￿
: (19)
Di⁄erentiating Equation (6) with respect to " for " ￿ ~ ", rearranging, and taking into account
that R(") = 0 for " 2 [~ ";^ "] gives
J
0 (") =
(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿0 (")J(") + I (" ￿ ^ ")[(￿(") + ￿)R0 (") + ￿0 (")R(")]
r + ￿(") + ￿ + ￿ + ￿
: (20)
Di⁄erentiating Equation (7) with respect to " for " ￿ ^ ", then substituting in from Equation
(20) and rearranging gives
(r + ￿(￿)￿(") + ￿ + ￿)R
0(") = ￿(￿)￿
0(")(J(") ￿ R(")) + ￿(￿)￿(")J
0("): (21)
Di⁄erentiating Equation (??) with respect to " for " 2 [^ ";"] and di⁄erentiating Equation
(16) with respect to " for " 2 [~ ";"] and combining these results give for " 2 [~ ";^ ")
k(") =
￿ (1 ￿ u)f(")
￿ + ￿(") + ￿ + ￿
(22)
33and for " 2 [^ ";"]; h(") and k (") are solutions to the system of linear equations
￿n(")f (") + ￿vf(") = [￿ + ￿(￿)￿(") + ￿]h(") ￿ (￿(") + ￿)k(") (23)
￿ (1 ￿ u)f(") = (￿ + ￿(") + ￿ + ￿)k(") ￿ ￿(￿)￿(")h("): (24)
Then one can solve for W (") from Equation (19) together with boundary condition
W (~ "w) = U, for J (") and R(") from Equations (20) and (21) together with boundary
conditions J (~ "f) = 0 and R(^ ") = 0, for H (") from Equations (23) together with boundary
condition H (^ ") = 0, and for K (") from Equations (22) and (24) together with boundary
condition K (~ ") = 0.
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Notes: Figure depicts the quit and layoff rates as functions of the establishment-level employment growth 
rate (all depicted as fractions of employment), and is taken from Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006a, 
p. 17). Rates are estimated over fine growth rate intervals that increase in size with the magnitude of 
growth. Estimates use pooled observations of JOLTS microdata, and the figure illustrates rates as a 5-
interval centered moving average with a discontinuity allowed at zero growth. 
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6.0 Hiring Rate (left axis)
Vacancy Rate (right axis)
 
Notes: Figure depicts the hiring and vacancy rates as functions of the establishment-level employment 
growth rate (all depicted as fractions of employment). Rates are estimated over fine growth rate intervals 
that increase in size with the magnitude of growth. The figure illustrates rates as a 5-interval centered 
moving average with a discontinuity allowed at zero-growth. Estimates are from Davis, Faberman, and 
Haltiwanger (2006b), who use pooled observations of JOLTS microdata.  
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Notes: Figure depicts the vacancy yield (measured as hires per reported vacancy for establishments with at 
least one vacancy) as a function of the establishment-level employment growth rate. The yield is estimated 
over fine growth rate intervals that increase in size with the magnitude of growth. The figure illustrates 
rates as a 5-interval centered moving average with a discontinuity allowed at zero-growth. Estimates are 
from Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006b), who use pooled observations of JOLTS microdata.  
  38Figure 4. Hiring and Vacancy Rates vs. the Quit Rate, Regression Results 
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Notes: Figures depict the (leading) hires rate (top panel) and vacancy rate (bottom panel) as a function of 
the establishment-level quit rate (all depicted as fractions of employment) and broken out by type of 
establishment-level employment growth (expanding, contracting, no change). Rates are estimated over fine 
quit rate intervals that increase in size with the rate. Estimates are from authors’ tabulations using pooled 





Figure 5. Firm Productivity Thresholds for Labor Dynamics 
 
Note: Figure depicts the three endogenously determined thresholds of the model described in the text, with 
the decision rules between each threshold noted. See text for details. 
  40Figure 6. Calibrated Job Destruction Rate (δ(ε)) and New Position Creation Rate 
(n(ε)) Functions  
 
Note: The figure depicts the calibrated exogenous job destruction rate (top panel) and new position creation 
rate (bottom panel) as a function of firm productivity, ε, used in the model’s simulation. See text for 
simulation details.
  41Figure 7. Model-Implied Quit Rate (μ(ε)) and Acceptance Probability (ξ(ε)) 
Functions 
 
Note: The figure depicts the model implied quit rate (top panel) and acceptance probability (i.e., the job-
filling rate, bottom panel) as a function of firm productivity, ε.  See text for simulation details.
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Note: The figure depicts the average simulated firm-level employment growth rate by firm productivity, ε. 
Estimates are smoothed using a 5-bin centered moving average across growth rate intervals identical to 
those used for the data analysis. See text for simulation details. 
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Note: The figure depicts the simulated layoff rate and simulated quit rate as a function of firm-level 
employment growth. Estimates are smoothed using a 5-bin centered moving average across growth rate 
intervals identical to those used for the data analysis. See text for simulation details.
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Note: The figure depicts the simulated vacancy rate and hiring rate as a function of firm-level employment 
growth. Estimates are smoothed using a 5-bin centered moving average across growth rate intervals 
identical to those used for the data analysis. See text for simulation details. 
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Note: The figure depicts the simulated vacancy yield (hires per vacancies posted at the beginning of the 
month) as a function of firm-level employment growth. Estimates are smoothed using a 5-bin centered 
moving average across growth rate intervals identical to those used for the data analysis. See text for 
simulation details. 
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Note: The figure depicts the simulated hiring rate and vacancy rate as a function of firm-level quit rate. 
Estimates are smoothed using a 5-bin centered moving average across growth rate intervals identical to 
those used for the data analysis. See text for simulation details. 
 
 
  45Table 1. Summary Statistics by Incidence of a Quit 
 
Full Sample 
No Previous Quit 
(qt = 0) 
Previous Quit 
(qt > 0) 
Quit Rate (t) 0.018  ---  0.031 
Hiring Rate (t + 1)  0.033  0.027  0.037 
Vacancy Rate (t) 0.022  0.013  0.029 
Layoff Rate (t)  0.012 0.013  0.011 
Share of Establishments  ---  0.860  0.140 
Share of Employment  ---  0.421  0.579 
Share of Hires (t + 1)  ---  0.353  0.647 
Share of Vacancies (t) ---  0.257  0.743 
Notes: Estimates are means (employment-weighted) and fractions across pooled establishment observations 
from authors’ tabulations using JOLTS microdata. Standard errors are all smaller than 0.0001. 
  46Table 2. Frequency of Vacancies and Hiring by Quit Incidence 
and Establishment Characteristics 
(a) Nonfarm Employment 
  Pr(vt > 0)  Pr(ht+1 > 0) 
  qt = 0  qt > 0  qt = 0  qt > 0 
By Incidence of Quit  0.25 0.75 0.36 0.86 
For All Establishments  0.54 0.65 
 
(b) Major Industry 
  Pr(vt > 0)  Pr(ht+1 > 0) 
  qt = 0  qt > 0  qt = 0  qt > 0 
Natural Resources & 
Mining  0.20 0.53 0.35 0.79 
Construction  0.13 0.44 0.37 0.77 
Manufacturing  0.30 0.67 0.43 0.79 
Transportation & 
Utilities  0.23 0.72 0.31 0.81 
Retail Trade  0.17 0.58 0.34 0.81 
Information  0.32 0.81 0.36 0.83 
FIRE  0.20 0.82 0.26 0.86 
Professional & 
Business Services  0.28 0.80 0.35 0.87 
Health & Education  0.26 0.90 0.33 0.92 
Leisure & Hospitality  0.21 0.63 0.43 0.84 
Other Services  0.15 0.60 0.22 0.75 
Government  0.41 0.88 0.43 0.92 
 
(c) Establishment Size 
  Pr(vt > 0)  Pr(ht+1 > 0) 
  qt = 0  qt > 0  qt = 0  qt > 0 
0-9 Employees  0.06 0.29 0.10 0.36 
10-49 Employees  0.18 0.43 0.31 0.59 
50-249 Employees  0.38 0.65 0.54 0.82 
250-999 Employees  0.61 0.84 0.71 0.91 
1000-4999 Employees  0.73 0.93 0.83 0.97 
5000+ Employees  0.81 0.92 0.94 0.99 
Notes: Estimates are the (employment-weighted) probabilities of a vacancy or a hire 
based on the incidence of at least one quit. Estimates come from authors’ tabulations 
using pooled observations of JOLTS microdata. 
 
  47Table 3. Vacancy and Hiring Statistics by Layoff Incidence 
(a) Summary Statistics 
  No Previous Layoff, or 
Layoff with a Quit 
(lt = 0 + [lt > 0, qt > 0]) 
Previous Layoff, 
 but No Quit 
(lt > 0, qt = 0) 
Quit Rate (t) 0.019  --- 
Hiring Rate (t + 1)  0.032  0.040 
Vacancy Rate (t) 0.022  0.020 
Layoff Rate (t)  0.007 0.083 
Share of Establishments  0.959  0.041 
Share of Employment  0.936  0.064 
Share of Hires (t + 1)  0.921  0.079 
Share of Vacancies (t) 0.941 0.059 
 
(b)Frequency of Vacancies and Hiring 
  Pr(vt > 0)  Pr(ht+1 > 0) 
  lt = 0 +  
lt > 0, qt > 0 
lt > 0,  
qt = 0 
lt = 0 +  
lt > 0, qt > 0 
lt > 0,  
qt = 0 
By Incidence of Layoff (with No 
Contemporaneous Quit)  0.55 0.46 0.65 0.62 
For All Establishments  0.54 0.65 
Notes: The top panel reports the estimated mean rates (employment-weighted) and fractions across pooled 
establishment observations from JOLTS, conditional on whether the observation had at least one reported 
layoff, but no quit (lt > 0, qt = 0). The lower panel reports the (employment-weighted) probabilities of a 
vacancy or a hire based on the same criteria. Standard errors on all estimates are all smaller than 0.0001. 
  48  49
Table 4. Establishment-Level Regressions, Hiring, Vacancies and the Quit Rate 
(a) Dependent Variable: hi,t+1 (Leading Hires) 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 








git     .012 
[.001] 
 
git > 0      .024 
[.001] 
git < 0      .003 
[.001] 
Establishment 
Effects?  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  .033 .291 .291 .292 
 

















git     -.307 
[.141] 
 
git > 0      1.170 
[.061] 
git < 0      .382 
[.062] 
Establishment 
Effects?  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  .120 .319 .319 .320 
 
(c) Dependent Variable: vit 
  (1) (2) (4) (5) 








git     .017 
[.0004] 
 
git > 0      .015 
[.001] 
git < 0      .019 
[.001] 
Establishment 
Effects?  No Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared  .022 .410 .413 .413 
Notes: Tables report coefficients and standard errors (in brackets) of OLS (or instrumental 
variables, where noted) for regressions of the noted dependent variable on the noted regressors 
using pooled establishment-month observations. N = 377,597. Regressions include establishment 
fixed effects where noted. For IV estimates, regressions use the lagged growth rate (column 3) or 
the lagged growth rates differentiated between rates that are positive or negative (column 4) as the 
instrument(s).  